ABSTRACT Flex-route transit service is now the most popular type of flexible transits to serve low-demand areas. In this paper, we develop a strategy to help transit planners to determine fare policies when the current traditional fixed-route transits turn to a flex-route operating policy. Analytical modeling and simulations are developed to appraise the service quality provided to different groups of passengers under these two operating policies. To be closer to reality, two criterions, defined as Criterion (NRP) and Criterion (RP), are introduced for further analysis based on the processing of the passengers refused by deviation service. Criterion (NRP) represents the scenario that the refused passengers would switch to other means of transportation and not be considered in the calculation of service quality function, and Criterion (RP) means that the refused passengers would walk to nearest checkpoints for expected service vehicle and be considered in the assessment of cost indicators. In various scenarios, where demand responsive requests pay additional money for personal deviation services and regular riders could expect a discounted fare for the imposed delay, optimal fare policies are derived based on the change of service quality after applying flex-route operating policy. Also, it is found that only fares of regular riders are susceptible to the choice between Criterion (NRP) and Criterion (RP).
I. INTRODUCTION
For a long time, traditional public transportation has been devoted to serving residents in dense urban areas, where fixed-route, fixed-schedule mode could be the most efficient and economical choice for transit operations, especially in congested downtowns and central business districts. However, recent social changes and development patterns all over the world have led to more sprawled low-demand suburban areas, and these new generated travel patterns require transit services to be more flexible. In the last two decades, flexible transit services have experienced tremendous growth. Based on a research by [1] , approximately 40 percent of 1100 transit agencies of the United States and Canada in their sample operated some kind of flexible transit services and among all these services, flex-route transit is by far the most popular form.
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Flex-route transit, also known as route deviation transit or Mobility Allowance Shuttle Transit, is an innovative combination of traditional flex-route transit service and demand responsive transit service. It is considered as fixed-route because it has a predetermined base route with fixed checkpoints and established schedules. On the other hand, it is considered as demand responsive for vehicles are permitted to deviate from the base route to serve curb-to-curb requests. Vehicles move as traditional fixed-route, fixed-schedule service if there is no demand responsive request to serve. Customers' reaction to flex-route transit services generally appears positive, based on a survey towards flex-route transit customers in Texas by Higgins and Cherrington [2] , more than 80% of respondents confirmed that flex-route services are more convenient than regular bus routes.
As a non-profit public service, the public transport division is more than self-financing, and passengers are only charged for a portion of the entire transit operation cost. National Transit Summaries and Trends (NTST) report for the year 2011 show that operating expense per passenger trip for demand responsive transit service is $ 31.8 with the average fare $2.35. In contrast, operating expense per passenger trip for fixed-route transit service is $4.9, with fares being approximately 20% of the expense. Demand responsive transit service offers the desired flexibility with a door-todoor transport service, but high subsidy burden limits this operation mode to be used in particular services such as paratransit. As a hybrid transit service, flex-route transit can be seen as a cost-efficient alternative to satisfy curb-to-curb requests on the basis of serving regular passengers.
In traditional fixed-route, fixed-schedule public transits, all passengers (without considering the disabled people and the elderly) share the same fare in one transit system, except in some distance-based fare cases passengers might be charged an additional fare for long-distance travel. In flex-route transits, any demand responsive request would cause the deviation from the base route and directly increase the riding time of passengers on board. In other words, the deviation operation offers high-quality service to the targeted curbto-curb request but would inevitably deteriorate the service quality of other riders. Transit services should be provided on the basis of fairness and equality so it is reasonable to consider that those demand responsive requests should pay an additional fee for their personal pick-up or drop-off services, and regular passengers could expect a discounted fare for their degraded service quality.
A survey over 118 flex-route bus lines belonging to 43 transit agencies all over the United States was conducted by authors in 2013. Results show that nearly 35% of practical cases in our sample implement single-fare policy, which means regular passengers and demand responsive requests pay the same fare in these flex-route transit lines. The others apply multiple-fare policy, where demand responsive riders spend more money than regular ones for deviation services, and some typical cases in this group are summarized in Table 1 . It is considered that the main reason for adopting single-fare policy in some cases is that in these service areas actual demand response requests are at a very low level and service vehicles are only allowed to do one or two deviations at most per ride. In these cases, few deviations and subsequent delay occur in operation, so there seems not to be a priority to force multiple-fare policy in these flex-route transit systems. But in service areas with high curb-to-curb demand, tenacious single-fare policy would be very likely to incur complaints and dissatisfaction to transit agencies from passengers for inequality.
As the most popular type of flexible transits, there is yet to be found a comprehensive guideline of the design and operation management. When transit agencies operate such flex-route bus lines, they are not sure how to design fare policy for specific systems. In most practical cases, transit agencies simply make decisions based on experience to enact fare policies, but it is hard to say that these policies could reflect the actual value of service offered to different groups of passengers. For instance, curb-to-curb passengers pay one dollar more than regular ones in OmniLink lines of Virginia but the deviation fare for South and North Routes in Tulare County of California is 6 times as much as base fare. VOLUME 7, 2019 As pointed out in the existing literature, various traffic management policies, implemented by transportation authorities, have an essential impact on commuters' travel mode selection behavior [3] . With the development of online car-hailing services [4] , bike-sharing [5] , and connected autonomous vehicles [6] , private transportation is more likely to be chosen, and public transit service exhibits a vast amount of under-utilized capacity in most cases [7] . In this condition, during the last few decades, there is a steady decline in the proportion of public transit passengers in many places around the world [8] . By using sophisticated theories and models from the scheduling theory, Zhang et al. [9] proposed a fixed-interval scheduling model and solution algorithm, which is exceedingly helpful to increase the attraction of public transit for urban travelers. With the increase of the elderly using public transit, public transit companies need to better understand the mobility needs and expectations of different type passengers [10] . Wang et al. [11] revealed that fare change is considered as a useful tool for public transit demand management. And the most significant sensitivity to fare change is shown by weekend passengers, followed by passengers in the evening weekday peak time, while the morning weekday peak-time passengers show little sensitivity. Through big data analytics, Liu et al. [12] found that public transit ridership can be boosted by reducing the fare cost per journey. So, to increase public transport usage, policymakers need to consider fare policy reform and ensure that services are accessible and affordable to the general public.
The fundamental justification for transit fares is that they should be set at a level which would lead to reasonably efficient use of these services. With recent advocates stressing the importance of transit and its role in sustainability, some methods and models have been proposed for optimal transit pricing strategies [13] , [14] . As stated by Zhao and Zhang [15] , changes in public transit fares can significantly affect the decisions of travelers on where, when, and how to travel. It is asserted that a reappraisal of transit fare structure is warranted, since subsidizing low-income riders may help address not only equity concerns, but also improve transit quality for all [16] . In these studies, social costs, including external environmental, accident and congestion effects and distributional considerations, were considered in the pricing of urban transport and a general framework for evaluating existing fare subsidies and potential pricing reform had been provided. But results from these macroscopic analysis models actually suggested the base fare in regional transit systems and cannot be used directly to distinguish appropriate fares between regular passengers and demand responsive requests under flex-route operating policy.
Flex-route operating policy is generally considered to make a beneficial effect in service areas with relatively low demand. In many cases, flex-route policy is implemented when demand does not support previous fixed-route services; in other cases, fixed-route policy and flex-route policy are alternately applied to satisfy fluctuant passenger flow in various service cycles. For example, MTA Line 646 in Los Angeles County offers fixed-route service during daytime and flex-route service at night; Route 3 in the City of Lawrence implements fixed-route policy in peak hours and flex-route policy in off-peak period. Since flex-route operating policy becomes more and more popular in suburban and rural transit systems, a reasonable fare strategy is necessary and indispensable for its influence on passengers' perceptions and opinions towards transit services.
So far, there haven't been many studies on pure flex-route transit systems. Daganzo [17] proved that demand responsive transits perform better in low demand areas and first explicitly described checkpoint systems (similar to flex-route service) could be possibly more cost-effective. A methodology to determine the optimal slack time allocation in flex-route segments was proposed by Fu [18] and some internal relationships between system design parameters were revealed. Quadrifoglio et al. [19] , [20] presented a mixed integer programming formulation for scheduling flex-route transit services and evaluated upper and lower bounds on the maximum longitudinal velocity in the given service area. The research by Alshalalfah and Shalaby [21] indicated that assigning an appropriate slack time was essential to have a high-performance flex-route service and more slack time cannot necessarily be translated into more ridership. The cost of a flex-route transit system in a grid network was analyzed by Nourbakhsh and Ouyang [22] and results showed that this new transit operating policy performs better than other comparable policies under low-to-moderate demand levels. As another common type of flexible transit services, there have been already a great many kinds of literature dedicated to demand responsive transit services. Most works concentrated on the scheduling and deployment of a fleet of demand responsive vehicles, and several reliable copies of scheduling software had been introduced [23] - [28] . Optimal system designs and evaluation analytic models for demand responsive transit services have also drawn a lot of attention [29] - [31] , and their results could be helpful as to making a choice between different transit operating policies. This paper intends to assist transit planners in determining fare policies when current fixed-route transit systems are being updated with innovative flex-route operating policy. It aims to investigate and assess the service offered to different groups of passengers under flex-route policy, based on price-performance under fixed-route policy.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION A. SERVICE AREA AND DEMAND
The model considered in our analysis is mainly based on the MTA Line 646 in Los Angeles County, with a single service vehicle and a rectangular service area of width 2W and length L (see Figure 1) . The 646 line, located near the Port of Los Angeles, transports passengers between the immense commercial center of the San Pedro area of Los Angeles County and the nearby bus terminal. During the day, this line serves as a fixed-route transit system. At night, the line becomes a flexed-route transit service that allows for a specific deviation of half a mile from both sides of the fixed route. The line includes a single vehicle covering a quasi-rectangular service area (approximately length10 mile and width1 mile), with two terminal checkpoints and an intermediate checkpoint located in the middle. The duration of each trip between terminal checkpoints is 30 minutes, and the headway is 1 hour. The service operates for 4.5 hours per night (9 trips) [32] .
In this transit system, in Figure 1 , W is the maximum allowable deviation from this base route in either side. There are K checkpoints (C 1 , C 2 , . . . C K ) along the base route, which are often located at connection centers and high-density demand sites. In our modeling checkpoint demands are assumed to be uniformly distributed among checkpoints and demands outside checkpoints have a uniform distribution in this service area. There are generally four possible types of passengers as follows with their respective proportions β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 and β 1 + β 2 + β 3 + β 4 = 1.
Type 1 (random): pick-up and drop-off not at checkpoints. Type 2 (hybrid): pick-up at checkpoints, and drop-off not at checkpoints.
Type 3 (hybrid): pick-up not at checkpoints, and drop-off at checkpoints.
Type 4 (regular): pick-up and drop-off at the checkpoints.
B. TWO TRANSIT OPERATING POLICIES
Fixed-route policy and Flex-route policy have been alternately adopted in MTA Line 646 to serve customers in this area. In our model, the service vehicle moves at the average speed V b and each stop has the dwelling time T d .
1) FIXED-ROUTE OPERATING POLICY
Fixed-route operating policy provides successive transport service for passengers, and the service vehicle moves back and forth along the base route with N stations (see Figure 2 ). We assume that adjacent stations have the same distance d, and it should be noticed that checkpoints under flex-route policy actually belong to the group of stations. Under fixed-route policy, all passengers can only be served at stations and all the requests outside stations have to walk to the nearest stations for expected service.
2) FLEX-ROUTE OPERATING POLICY
The service vehicle moves along the base route back and forth between checkpoint C 1 and C K , and must visit all the checkpoints in turn every ride. Each checkpoint has its predetermined departure time t c , which is regarded as an inviolable constraint in operation. If deviation services in some ride do not consume the total slack time of a flex-route VOLUME 7, 2019 segment between two checkpoints, there will be idle time at the downstream checkpoint until the scheduled departure time. It should be noted that flex-route operating policy cannot guarantee all demand responsive requests could be served for the limitation of predetermined slack time.
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION A. MEASURE OF SERVICE QUALITY
Service quality is the overall measured or perceived the performance of transit service from the passenger's point of view. While there are many valid perspectives for assessing transit performance, in our model, service quality function S is constructed in Equation (1) as the weighted sum of three cost indicators with their respective weights w 1 , w 2 , w 3 .
where, E(T wk ) = expected value of walking time of passengers during their trips.
E(T wt ) = expected value of waiting time of passengers before pick-up. For passengers under fixed-route operating policy and regular ones under flex-route operating policy, waiting time means the interval between passengers' arrival time at stations and pick-up time; demand responsive passengers (type 1, 2 and 3 requests) under flex-route operating policy are more likely to spend their time at offices, at houses or comfortable locations instead of waiting outside before earliest possible scheduled pick-up time, so their waiting time is defined as the time interval between scheduled pick-up time and actual pick-up time.
E(T rd ) = expected value of riding time of passengers between pick-up and drop-off.
Compared to traditional fixed-route policy, the most competitive advantage of flex-route policy is the curb-to-curb service provided to customers and riders accepted by deviation services have no walking in their trips, which is preferred especially in extreme conditions, such as unsafe surroundings at night and bad weather. These three weights of cost indicators are considered to be sensitive to external operating surroundings, and their values may be changed in different circumstances. But in any situation service quality function S can still be regarded as a valid tool to assess service value under both operating policies and it is evident that for each group of passengers, the higher value of function S implies the worse service performance of specific transit policy.
B. FIXED-ROUTE POLICY ANALYTICAL MODELING
Compared with complicated vehicle routing operation under flex-route policy, it is possible to derive analytical modeling for service quality functions under fixed-route policy. Also, simulations developed for fixed-route operating policy would be performed later in order to test analytical modeling. Considering that the distances between adjacent checkpoints are almost the same in MTA Line 646 system, it is assumed that in our modeling checkpoints are evenly distributed along the base route in order to simplify analytical modeling.
Consider the fixed-route transit service for passengers with N stations (see Figure 2 ). It is a rectangle area with width 2W and length L. Based on the proof by Qiu et al. [33] , the expected value of walking time E(t wk ) for passengers to their nearest stations can be expressed as:
where V p represents the average walking speed of passengers. In this transit system, type 1 passengers need to walk twice in their trips, and based on mathematical probability theory, the expected value of walking time for type 1 passengers is calculated by:
Hybrid passengers have to walk once on trips, and regular passengers have no walking, so, it could be calculated by:
It is considered that under fixed-route operating policy passengers at stations can be mainly divided into two groups: schedule-independent riders (a fraction α), who arrive at station randomly and schedule-dependent ones (a fraction 1−α), who intend to follow the transit schedule in order to eliminate their waiting time. Based on the study by Welding [34] and Osuna and Newell [35] , the expected waiting time E(t wt ) for schedule-independent riders is a function of the average headway E(H ) and variations in the headway s 2 (H ), which is shown by:
where H is the mean service headway of the fixed-route transit service.
The headway under fixed-route policy is equal to cycle time T c , which is shown by:
Also based on mathematical probability theory, the expected values of waiting time for four types of passengers are shown by:
In an analogous fashion, it is possible to derive the expected values of riding time for four types of passengers from. Which can be calculated from:
So for each type of passengers, the service quality function under fixed-route policy can be derived by:
C. FLEX-ROUTE POLICY SIMULATION
It can be known from Equation 1 that service quality function S is the weighted sum of three cost indicators of walking time, waiting time, and riding time of passengers between pick-up and drop-off. As flex-route transit can provide curb-to-curb service to customers, under flex-route policy, the service quality S is only a function of the riding time of passengers. Since the riding time required for passengers between pickup and drop-off is not the same, the flex-route transit service has a different value of time (VoT) for different groups of passengers. Because of flexible vehicle routing plans due to demand responsive requests, it would be challenging to derive analytical modeling for service quality function S under flex-route operating policy. So in this paper, simulation modeling is developed with MATLAB 2010b software to analyze and appraise cost indicators under flex-route policy. Considering that the demand is uniformly distributed in this service area, in our simulation modeling 50 replications of 5000 operating cycles will be performed for each scenario in order to guarantee the stability of simulation results.
Our simulation replicates vehicle operation with the help of an insertion heuristic, which is generally regarded as a classical and efficient resolution for scheduling demand responsive transit services or dial-a-ride problems. In our simulation, the computation time of 5000 operating cycles with 25 customers per hour is about 50 seconds (processor Intel Core i5, 4 GB RAM). Vehicle rectilinear travel is applied into our simulation, for it is a good approximation of realistic road network [36] . Demand responsive requests would be likely to be rejected by deviation services if the slack time of flex-route segments is exhausted by previous requests.
The insertion algorithm in simulation modeling is not a real-time one. As in our survey, nearly all practical deviation services require reservations in advance. Let p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p m denote m passengers in a service ride and curb-to-curb services are available on a first-come, firstserved basis. It is assumed that the capacity of the service vehicle is unlimited since flex-route operating policy is generally implemented at low-demand service areas. Before each ride, the insertion algorithm completes the vehicle routing plan by selecting the minimum additional distance at each request insertion step. Type 4 passengers will be absolutely served by the service vehicle; type 2 and type 3 passengers would be accepted by deviation services when their destinations or starting points outside checkpoints are feasible for insertion; type 1 passengers would be accepted only on the condition that their pick-up and drop-off points are both feasible in the vehicle routing plan at the same time.
The pseudo-code for the insertion algorithm are summarized and discussed as follows:
Step 1: Insert p 1 · Identify the type of p 1 · Slack time will be checked for possible insertions in corresponding flexroute segments if p 1 is a demand responsive request. The vehicle routing plan will be updated if the insertion procedure succeeds. For example, in the ride C 1 → C K , if p 1 (type 1), who has pick-up point in the segment between C 1 and C 2 , and drop-off point in the segment between C K −1 and C K , is accepted by deviation services, the possible route is
Step 2: Insert p 2 · p 2 would be accepted if he belongs to the type 4 passenger group. If p 2 is a demand responsive passenger, allot demand responsive point(s) to respective segment(s) and select the minimum additional distance for possible insertion(s). Check the slack time in segments and determine whether to accept p 2 and update the vehicle routing plan.
Step 3: Insert p 3 · p 3 would be accepted if he belongs to the type 4 passenger group. If p 3 is a demand responsive passenger, allot demand responsive point(s) to respective segment(s) and select the minimum additional distance for possible insertion(s). Check the slack time in segments and determine whether to accept p 3 and update the vehicle routing plan.
Step m-1: Insert p m−1 . The same as the previous step.
Step m: Insert p m · p m would be accepted if he belongs to the type 4 passenger group. If p m is a demand responsive passenger, allot demand responsive point(s) to respective segment(s) and select the minimum additional distance for possible insertion(s). Check the slack time in segments and determine whether to accept p m and update the vehicle routing plan.
IV. RESULT ANALYSIS A. PARAMETER VALUES
In MTA Line 646 system there are three checkpoints (K = 3), two terminal checkpoints and one intermediate checkpoint set in the middle of the base route. Some default parameter values for analysis are the average walking speed of passengers (V p = 3 mile/h), average vehicle speed (V b = 25 mile/h), bus station distance under fixed-route policy (d = 0.5 mile), dwelling time (T d = 12 s). According to the research by Hess et al. [37] , it is assumed that in our analysis 42 percent VOLUME 7, 2019 of passengers under fixed-route policy and regular ones under flex-route policy are considered to coordinate their arrival at stations with the transit schedule.
The majority of customers in MTA Line 646 system belong to hybrid passengers, so we assume the default proportions of passengers are β 1 = 0.1, β 2 = 0.4, β 3 = 0.4, β 4 = 0.1. It is verified in our simulations that type 2 and type 3 passengers have a very similar character in operation, so in our analysis, these two types of passengers are combined as a one-deviation group. So our research actually studies fare policies for three groups of passengers (TP 1, TP 2&3, TP 4), and the proportions of TP 1, TP 2&3, TP 4 is 10%, 80%, and 10% respectively.
There are also some other parameter values as follows, but they are possible to change in different scenarios.
(1) It is found in our survey that most of flex-route transit systems could deviate up to three-quarters of a mile on either side of the base route. Three-quarters of a mile is in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirement for complementary paratransit along fixed routes. However, nearly all current flex-route transit services in our sample are open to the general public and not limited to that requirement. The service area of MTA Line 646 is 10 mile 2 , with L = 10 mile and W = 0.5 mile. Here another two L W ratios (L W = 10 and L W = 5) are defined with the same system default values, so as to study the influence of service area shape on fare policies.
(2) We assume w 2 = 1 and w 3 = 2 since in communities passengers are more likely to wait for the service vehicle near their familiar offices, houses, or cozy terminals. Weight w 1 is most susceptible to external operating circumstances, and here, the default value is set w 1 = 2. Sensitivity analysis overweight w 1 will be performed in the subsequent studies.
(3) MTA Line 646 system operates with about only 6 minutes slack time per ride due to the low actual demand. Since we intend to test flex-route operating policy with higher demand levels, in our analysis, there will be a more considerable slack time in order to accommodate more riders. The default slack time per cycle is assumed to be equal to the actual running time without deviations (equal to T c in Equation (7), where N = K ) in each scenario and slack time would be evenly distributed among flex-route segments.
B. PASSENGERS REFUSED BY DEVIATION SERVICES
There is some possibility under flex-route operating policy that part of demand responsive requests might be rejected by deviation services due to the exhaustion of slack time. It is considered that passengers' trips comply with their daily schedule and few passengers refused would wait patiently for the next ride, especially in commuter trips. Passengers refused by deviation services would have a motive to turn to other travel modes such as taxis and private vehicles, in order to avoid walking. However, there might be other customers in communities relying on transit service, who cannot afford other transport services, having to walk in their trips. In our analysis, two criterions are introduced for further analysis based on the processing of passengers refused by deviation service, Criterion (NRP) represents the scenario that refused passengers would switch to other means of transportation and not be considered in the calculation of service quality function S; Criterion (RP) means that refused passengers would walk to the nearest checkpoints for expected service vehicle and be considered in the assessment of cost indicators.
C. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
The results of analytical modeling for fixed-route policy are exhibited in Table 2 , which are calculated by fixed-route policy analytical models in section III.
D. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulations are performed for fixed-route policy and flexroute policy by Criterion (NRP), and results are shown from Table 3 to Table 5 with various L/W ratios. It is evident that under flex-route policy, the vehicle could transport riders to their expected destinations, and they have no walking in trips (E(T wk ) = 0).
There are some meaningful findings from Table 2 to Table 5: (1) The analytical results for fixed-route policy in Table 2  are matched well with the simulation results from Table 3 to  Table 5 , which verifies the reliability of our simulation modeling, and it is found that expected values of cost indicators under fixed-route policy keep stable at different demand levels.
(2) Under fixed-route policy, E(T wk ) increases with a lower L/W ratio of the service area but E(T wt ) and E(T rd ) shows opposite trends, which is reasonable since with a lower L/W ratio, passengers need to finish a longer walk to stations and the transit system operates with a smaller service cycle time.
(3) Under flex-route policy, E(T rd ) of each group of riders is inevitably larger than that under the traditional fixed-route policy because of deviation services. On the other hand, E(T wt ) of demand responsive riders is impressively low with the help of reservation systems.
E. FARE POLICY UNDER FLEX-ROUTE POLICY BY CRITERION (NRP)
Based on the above research, it is possible to obtain service quality function values (Equation (14)) for each group of passengers. Figures 3-5 show how service quality functions of these three groups change at different demand levels in the service area with various L/W ratios. It is found that demand responsive riders enjoy better service under flexroute policy in comparison of under fixed-route policy, but regular riders experience a considerable rise in service quality function values. With the increase of demand in this service area, these differences decrease between function values of demand responsive passengers under two policies, but for regular passengers, these differences are enlarged. Results also show that with a lower L/W ratio, service quality function values of type 1 and type 2&3 passengers will experience a more significant decline under flex-route policy. Meanwhile, there will be a smaller growth in the service quality function of regular passengers. This finding suggests that from the perspective of passengers, they would be more likely to prefer flex-route policy in a service area with a lower L/W ratio.
It is believed that there are several possible options for transit planner to build fare policy for flex-route services. It is found that in many practical multiple-fare cases the fare of regular passengers under flex-route policy is the same as the base fare under fixed-route policy, and now it could be possible to determine deviation fees for demand responsive requests based on our assessment of service quality after flex-route policy. This fare policy is considered to be easy to apply and could increase transit revenue by providing personal deviation service. As a non-profit service, here another possible and more complicated fare strategy preferred by passengers is discussed that with sufficient subsidies from the government, transit division is not meant to enhance revenue by offering this new transit service. At this condition with the fares of demand responsive passengers rising, the TP 4 fare is expected to drop due to the delay imposed on regular passengers by deviation service. In our analysis, it is assumed that the fare of some group under flex-route policy is calculated based on the change of their service quality function values. For instance, when the service quality function of type 1 passengers in this transit system drops by half under flexroute policy, these passengers will pay doubled base fare for deviation service.
Mattson and Ripplinger [13] considered optimal fare should cover marginal social cost of transit service, including gas consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, roadway facility costs et al., which mainly depends on vehicle operation mileage in the calculation. For the second fare strategy discussed above, transit managers could keep the same revenue under these two transit policies, but it is more reasonable to adjust revenue according to the fluctuation of actual marginal social cost, since the service vehicle may run different miles within the same duration of operation under two transit policies. On the other hand, it should be noticed that since the base fare under fixed-route policy is assessed based on the performance of regional transit systems instead of a specific transit system, it cannot guarantee that under fixed-route policy revenue from a specific bus line could just cover the marginal social cost of this bus line. For the system in our modeling, it is assumed that revenue from riders could cover the proportion µ of total marginal social cost Cost fixed of this transit system under fixed-route policy. Which is shown by: (15) where Q 1 , Q 2&3 , Q 4 are the quantities of the three riders groups under fixed-route policy; f fixed is the base fare under fixed-route policy. Under flex-route policy, we can get: (16) where Cost flex represents the marginal social cost of this transit system under flex-route policy; λ i means the variation coefficients of service quality functions for the three groups, and it could be set as λ 1 , λ 2&3 , λ 4 ; f flex is the base fare under flex-route policy; q i is the quantities of the three riders groups on board under flex-route policy, and it could be set as q 1 , q 2&3 , q 4 . Also, the relationship between marginal social costs under these two transit policies could be derived by:
Cost flex (17) where M fixed means the travel mileage under fixed-route policy; M flex represents the travel mileage under flex-route policy.
Here we assume µ = 1, which indicates the revenue from riders under fixed-route policy could just cover the marginal social cost of this transit system. Then it is possible to obtain f flex as follows, and the actual fares for these three passenger groups are λ 1 f flex , λ 2&3 f flex , λ 4 f flex . Which can be calculated by:
Based on the above research, the fare policies under different demand levels in the service area are presented in figures 6-8 with various area shapes and weights w 1 of walking time. At each demand level, it is reasonable to see the relationship fare 1 > fare 2&3 > fare 4 under flex-route policy. At deficient demand, it could be surprised to found all fares are lower than the base fare under fixed-route policy and this is mainly because in this condition there will be sizeable idle time at checkpoints resulting in a drop of marginal social cost in operation. In fact, for a practical case, it would be impossible to set such a sizeable slack time for so few demands, which could result in wasting a great deal of time at checkpoints. On the other hand, in order to guarantee the level of service for flex-route services, there should be some control parameters such as acceptance rate of demand responsive passengers. This acceptance rate is considered to be closely related to passengers' satisfaction and attitude towards transit service since nobody would like VOLUME 7, 2019 to be rejected by expected flex-route service. As the demand increases, the acceptance rate of demand responsive passengers will undergo a significant drop (see the percentage in figures 6-8). For instance, in Figure 8 when the demand rises to 18 passenger/10mile 2 /h, the acceptance rates of type 1 and type 2&3 requests decline to 53% and 74%, which are evidently too low and suggests the system now cannot afford such a large number of passengers, and it is very likely to lead to passengers' complaint and dissatisfaction towards transit providers. For a specific service area, a successful and reasonable flex-route transit system should be set with reasonable slack time in coordination with actual demand, which is a critical point in transit planning but not the focus of this research.
Figures 6-8 show that in a service area with a lower L/W ratio, the fare of demand responsive riders would grow faster meanwhile the fare of regular ones would enjoy a more significant discount. This is partly due to a smaller number of riders on board for a higher probability of demand responsive requests to be rejected by flex-route service and also because demand responsive riders enjoy a better travel experience with a lower L/W ratio. These results also indicate that as the weight w 1 rises, which often indicates unsafe surroundings or unpleasant weather, the TP 1 fare goes up while the TP 4 fare goes down at the same time. Meanwhile, TP 2&3 fares almost keep the same with different weights w 1 , which is mainly because type 2&3 ones occupy the majority of passengers in this transit system and the changes in TP 2&3 fare are not apparent as other fares. The stability of TP 2&3 fare might not go on like this in other transit systems with different proportions of passengers.
F. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN FARE PLANS BY TWO CRITERIONS
As another possible situation, the fare policy by Criterion (RP) is studied in this section in a similar fashion as Criterion (NRP). In practical use, the choice between these two criterions for a specific system might depend on the composition of the transit system, riders' survey or the development of the community. Figures 9-11 shows the fare policies for this transit system by Criterion (NRP) and Criterion (RP) with different service area shapes. Results indicate that in each scenario at low demand the fares by two criterions are almost the same, especially for TP 1 and VOLUME 7, 2019 TP 2&3 fares. With the increase of demand, the fares by Criterion (NRP) for the three groups are progressively higher than that by Criterion (RP), which is reasonable since by Criterion (RP), more passengers would finish their trip with the help of bus service and the average fare could be reduced. It is already known that this transit system with designed parameter values cannot afford significant demand and it seems that at acceptable demand levels the choice of criterions has little influence on TP 1 and TP 2&3 fares but may evidently affect the fares of regular passengers. Results also suggest that with a lower L/W ratio, the difference between TP 4 fares by two criterions would be more evident in this service, mainly because more demand responsive requests switch to regular ones in operation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses a problem faced by transit planners in determining fare plans when existing traditional fixed-route transit policy turns to flex-route policy in a given transit system. By comparing service quality function values of riders under these two policies, it is feasible to figure out fare policies for each group of riders. This methodology in our research is considered to be a flexible strategy since it could be a static one in service areas with stable passenger flow or a dynamic one for fluctuant passenger flow. The service-based fare concept proposed by our research could also be used in other transit services, and it could provide the transit planners a useful tool to design more preferred and reasonable fare policies.
In our research Criterion (NRP) and Criterion (RP), depending on the processing of passengers refused by deviation services, have been introduced in order to be closer to reality. Despite possible fare plans which could increase transit revenue by implementing flex-route policy, this paper mainly focuses on a scenario without pursuing additional revenue after new flex-route policy, which would be especially preferred by regular riders, since they could get discounted fare for the delay caused by deviation service. Our research presents fare policies under flex-route policy by Criterion (NRP) with different L/W ratios, and results indicate that in a service area with a lower L/W ratio, at the same demand level demand responsive requests would expect a higher fare while the fare of regular riders would decline. Also, sensitivity analysis overweight w 1 of walking time is performed, and results suggest that in this transit system a larger w 1 , which often represents unsafe surrounding or unpleasant weather, would lead to the rise of TP 1 fare and drop of TP 4 fare, but for hybrid passengers there are little changes in their fares. It could be concluded by the comparison between Criterion (NRP) and Criterion (RP) that in this system the choice of criterions has little influence on TP 1 and TP 2&3 fares but TP 4 fare is expected to have an apparent drop by Criterion (RP) compared with by Criterion (NRP).
There are still some limitations to our research. The proportion of regular passengers following bus schedule under flex-route policy might be higher than that under fixed-route policy since they would have a more significant motive to consult the schedule to reduce waiting time for the longer headway under flex-route policy. Because of the additional reservation system and relevant devices, the operation cost for flex-route service might be a little higher than implementing fixed-route policy, which is not considered in our analysis. On the other hand, vehicle rectilinear movement and uniformly distributed requests may not be realistic in service areas with complex road networks, so future work should include applying this fare strategy into practical cases with various patterns of land use plans and road networks. Furthermore, our research suggests that for a designed transit system, the new flex-route policy can only have a positive effect at certain demand levels, so in future, another possible research topic is to study the setting conditions for flex-route policy in a given service area. 
